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Abstract The objective of this study is to document the 
reaction of international students to the 11 March 2011 emer-
gency in order to inform and improve disaster management 
strategies, both public and institutional. The study is based 
mainly on a questionnaire survey carried out in August 2011 
and follow-up interviews with students and other stakeholders. 
It describes the background of Tohoku University’s School of 
Engineering and covers six different stages in the evolution of 
the emergency: (1) immediate response; (2) taking shelter in 
Sendai; (3) life in the city during the aftermath; (4) sheltering 
outside Sendai; (5) coming back; plus (6) an overview of the 
experience. Major findings include: the process of evacuation 
and safety confirmation was successful, yet the subsequent 
phases (2 and 3) went on mostly unmanaged; students relied 
mostly on secondary sources of information to make deci-
sions, mainly family and friends of the same nationality, most 
of whom probably were not better informed than the students 
themselves. Based on the findings, suggestions for future 
disaster planning are advanced, as well as a discussion on the 
challenges of information provision during crisis. 
Keywords collective behavior, disaster management, emer-
gency response, Great East Japan Earthquake, information 
collection, international students
1 Introduction and Background of the 
Study
The Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 triggered 
manifold situations that tested the preparedness and resilience 
of society as a whole. The advanced stage of Japanese global-
ization in terms of people, goods, capital, and information, 
adds several layers of complexity to emergency management, 
resulting in several emerging challenges. A specially demand-
ing new task was communicating the situation and catering 
to international students. Attention to foreigners in general 
received limited though passionate attention during the first 
part of the emergency, especially in the mass media, in institu-
tions directly linked to foreigners’ life in Japan, and among 
persons with foreign background. For instance, an editorial 
in the Asahi Shinbun decried the apparent stampede of for-
eigners out of the country, concluding that the reconstruction 
process was a task of none but Japanese (Asahi Shinbun 
2011). In other national and international media, as well as 
in Internet social networks, the discussion followed suit. 
Nonetheless, there has been little to no academic input to this 
discussion and so the present survey is a contribution in that 
respect. 
The main goal of this study is to document the reaction 
of international students to the emergency in order to inform 
and hopefully improve disaster management strategies, both 
public and institutional. It presents the case of the Engineer-
ing School of Tohoku University, located in Sendai. The city 
is the closest large urban area to the epicenter of the earth-
quake, and Tohoku University is the biggest in the city, one of 
the top 10 educational institutions of the country, and ranks 
among top 100 of the world. Given its international stature, 
Tohoku University hosts numerous international students 
and researchers. In fact, 28.1 percent of the 10,271 foreigners 
registered in Sendai have international student visas, the 
largest share by occupation (Sendai City Government 2013), 
about 60 percent of them are enrolled in Tohoku University. 
Among the 10 schools that comprise the university, the 
Engineering School hosts the largest number of international 
students. At the time of the disaster, 485 persons, including 
exchange and short-term students, were studying at the 
Engineering School. A total of 85 percent of the international 
students come from Asian countries with the majority being 
Chinese (40%) and Korean (20%). About 45 percent of all 
international students were enrolled in doctoral courses, 32 
percent studied in masters programs, 17 percent were under-
graduates, and 5 percent were research students who usually 
were in the process of joining one of the graduate programs. 
A focus on the university and the engineering school offers a 
valuable entry point to understand the situation of the interna-
tional student population, which in the Kanto area reaches 
more than 60,000 persons.
The School of Engineering and its related graduate schools 
are located in two university campuses, Aobayama and 
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Katahira; most of the international students arriving at 
Tohoku University stay or live close to the dormitories at 
Sanjo (Figure 1). After the earthquake, all buildings were 
evacuated and no fatalities were reported. At the school of 
Engineering in Aobayama from around 4:30 p.m. those able 
to go back home were free to do so. The university is not a 
designated shelter, yet after the tremors, the safety of at least 
two buildings, one in each campus, was determined and 
pre parations for in-house sheltering were undertaken, with 
around 300 persons staying at the Aobayama central hall shel-
ter. Among these preparations, a paper-based record of the 
people there was compiled and whiteboards for information 
sharing were also set up. 
In terms of physical damage, three buildings of the faculty 
were deemed unsafe for further usage, and another handful 
received a yellow grade of danger—some areas are affected, 
but persons could enter those buildings. Located close to 
Sendai city central station, Katahira campus was the fastest to 
recover electricity and water supply from the Engineering-
related areas. At least one of the pumps used to provide water 
to Aobayama campus was damaged by the earthquake and it 
took more than a week to repair; water and electricity supply 
were totally recovered by 1 April, although city gas supply 
recovery took a little longer. The Graduate School of Envi-
ronmental Studies had installed a grid of solar cells that were 
used by people in need of electricity, especially cellphones, 
although the quality of the signal for the latter was deficient. 
After assessing the situation, the university decided to 
suspend classes and graduation ceremonies, as well as to 
postpone the beginning of the new academic year on 1 April. 
The decision was made public on the university homepage on 
16 March. Because March is spring break at the university, 
the time of year when graduation ceremonies are held and 
students are free to take some time off, students begin to leave 
campus as early as the middle of February in some cases. 
Ordinarily classes restart in the first week of April, but 
because of the earthquake, they did not begin until the second 
week of May. A time line of major events is included in 
Table 1. 
2 Literature review
There is very little literature specific to the reaction of inter-
national students to large-scale disasters. Schuh and Santos 
Laanan (2006) describe the case of students in general and 
Figure 1. Map of Tohoku University facilities in Sendai city
Source: Tohoku University home page (https://www.tohoku.ac.jp/english/profile/campus/01/access/).
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suggest a hypothetical scenario informed by the aftermath of 
Katrina in the United States. Cavanaugh (2006) advances a 
general crisis management plan for universities; both papers 
are without relevant references and based on anecdotal evi-
dence. The volume edited by Suzuki (1996), who documents 
the experience during the Kobe Earthquake in 1995 through 
personal accounts, case studies, analysis of the news, and 
a quantitative survey, is the only example at hand. Some 
general issues of concern during 2011 also emerged in 1995, 
namely: how to confirm safety, how much can/should univer-
sity persons in charge do, the problem of living in a city 
with a disrupted lifeline, and whether foreign students should 
leave the city/country or not. Nonetheless, the two disasters 
are different in ways that make comparison difficult. In terms 
of damage, the 1995 earthquake directly hit Kobe City, result-
ing in heavy infrastructure destruction and the outbreak of 
fires that caused 12 casualties among international students. 
In contrast, in the largest city close to the epicenter, Sendai, 
physical damage because of the 11 March 2011 earthquake 
was limited and no international student victim was reported. 
The advance in information and communication technologies 
during the last 17 years has been remarkable, so while in the 
past the safety confirmation was done mainly face to face or 
through paper-based lists in Kobe, in 2011 there was a wider 
range of options available. Perhaps more significantly, the 
emergency in Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant was a 
crucial factor conditioning behavior after the earthquake 
and the tsunami struck. In other words, the possibility of a 
comparative analysis is limited.
A broader view on the literature encounters the question 
of whether international students are actually a vulnerable 
population in need of special treatment. Globally recognized 
guidelines for disaster response, such as the IASC (2006) or 
the Sphere Project (2011), include as vulnerable populations 
internally displaced persons, women, children and adoles-
cents, older persons, persons with disabilities, persons living 
with HIV/AIDS, single parent households, ethnic and reli-
gious minority groups, and indigenous peoples. Some inter-
national students may belong to some of them but not all of 
them as a group. Academic compilations, such as the four 
tomes prepared by the Hyogo Earthquake Memorial 21st 
Century Research Institute (2011) or Wisner, Gaillard, and 
Kelman’ handbook (2012), do not include them. Not even 
Kuban and MacKenzie-Carey’s effort (2001) to develop a 
methodology to determine specific vulnerable populations 
resulted in international students inclusion in their long list of 
potential candidates. 
Nonetheless, there are at least two major arguments that 
warrant attention over international students’ condition of 
special vulnerability: one is their commonality with emerging 
vulnerable groups and the other is the inadequacy of the 
approach existing in Japan. 
In terms of international students’ commonality with 
emerging vulnerable groups, some insights can be drawn 
from the existing literature about the closest recognized 
categories: minorities or tourists. Drabek (1999) found that 
ethnic minorities tend not to trust official disaster warnings. 
Particularly in the case of Katrina, there is evidence showing 
that a combination of poverty and perceptions of racism and 
inequities were among the reasons for African Americans not 
to evacuate (Elder et al. 2007). Bankoff (2012) suggests that 
minorities could be blamed for the disaster, which is in fact 
Table 1. Timeline of major actions by actor
Day University School of Engineering International Students
March 11 
(Friday)
-  Establishing central crisis response 
team
- Building evacuation
-  First paper-based safety confirmation
- Disbanding (circa 4:30)
- Temporary shelters established
- Start of sheltering decisions 
-  Start of safety confirmation with 
families and acquaintances
March 13 -  First foreign government sponsored 
evacuation leaving Sendai
March 14 -  Meetings within schools and general 
meetings
- Peak of students leaving the city
March 15 - First message from the president -  100% of students report contact with 
families 
March 16 -  Decision to close the university 
published in the university homepage
March 17 -  Announcement about the official 
safety confirmation system
-  Peak of students leaving the country
March 18 -  Results of first on-campus radiation 
levels measurement
-  100 % of students report contact with 
the university 
Start of April -  Total water and electricity recovery
- Full safety confirmation
May 9 Official re-start of classes
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not new, since after the Kanto Earthquake in 1923 rumors 
of foreigners vandalizing the city triggered the killing of 
thousands of Koreans by vigilante groups. 
Tourists in popular destinations hit by a mega-disaster, 
such as those affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami, do 
become vulnerable (Steckley and Doberstein 2011) and can 
even overwhelm the local system (Deebaj, Castrén, and Öhlén 
2011). Some 20,000 Swedes, 10,000 Britons, and 4,000 Finns 
were in the disaster area, with all the logistic problems such 
large numbers generate. It has been suggested that foreigners 
may be more prone to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Yonekura 2012), but there is no solid evidence in this 
respect. At least in connection to suicidal behavior there are 
no definitive conclusions that can be drawn (Kõlves, Kõlves, 
and De Leo 2013), specially because suicidal behavior may 
follow complex, non-linear patterns (Matsubayashi, Sawada, 
and Ueda 2013).
International students may or may not share some of 
these conditions of vulnerability. They are a minority but are 
neither homogeneous in terms of ethnicity nor historically 
pressured by society. They may have no deep roots in the city, 
but they are not as transient as tourists. These similarities 
merit further investigation. 
In the same way as it seems inaccurate to treat interna-
tional students as minorities or tourists, the category “foreign-
ers,” widely accepted in Japan (Naito 2011; Sendai City 
Government 2013), also seems flawed. The category “for-
eigners” puts permanent residents and tourists, housewives 
and international students into the same box. Researchers 
who have tried to study foreigners as a single population in 
the context of disaster management attest to their heterogene-
ity (Henry, Kawasaki, and Meguro 2012; Omura 2012; 
Yonekura 2012). 
The reasons for the inclusion of foreigners as a vulnerable 
population, namely language capacity and cultural/religious 
practices (Kimura 2012), do not hold water. The differences 
in language skills among foreigners are too evident to require 
further comment. No rigorous research is available about how 
the cultural differences of foreigners in Japan affect disaster 
response, and related literature usually relies primarily on 
anecdotal evidence (Kimura 2012; Naito 2011). Studies else-
where have pointed out that the cultural argument may not 
be significant even for tourists. Seabra et al. (2013) show that 
the risk perception of tourists varies widely, and Reisinger 
and Crotts (2010) present evidence revealing that cultural 
differences among tourists from different countries are not 
as significant as differences among tourists from the same 
country. Reaction to risk seems to depend much on contex-
tual characteristics. Drabek (1999) points out divergence in 
the resulting behaviors depending on whether tourists are 
starting or ending their trips, and whether they are staying at 
a hotel or with relatives. 
Nonetheless, it has been recognized that “foreignness” can 
be a source of special vulnerability (Tompkins, Hurlston, and 
Poortinga 2009). Lack of language skills can become a source 
of vulnerability, no matter if the person is a foreigner or not. 
U.S. legislation on nondiscrimination in disaster assistance 
was modified after Katrina, adding English proficiency (or 
lack thereof) to such traits as race, color, religion, nationality, 
sex, age, or economic status.i Tompkins, Hurlston, and 
Poortinga (2009) show how in the Cayman Islands not only 
migrants but even returning residents who spend some 
significant time living abroad adopt “foreign” views about 
location, valuing the benefits of coastal sites above their 
risks. Their forgetfulness thus results in more exposition to 
hurricanes and tropical storms, which can be associated to a 
cultural change. 
The crux of the matter is the need to reconcile these (and 
probably other) legitimate sources of vulnerability with the 
practical need to identify target groups for the design of poli-
cies and protocols of action. By documenting the reaction of 
international students, the present work suggests alternative 
populations that better satisfy these two needs in order to 
better tailor disaster risk reduction activities.
3 Methodology
To investigate the reaction of international students from the 
School of Engineering at Tohoku University, a questionnaire 
survey was developed. The survey was designed to collect 
basic information about students’ behavior through each stage 
of the emergency, as well as personal characteristics of rele-
vance for the analysis. The stages—1 to 6 in Table 2—were 
defined through discussions with professors of the school and 
personal observation during the disaster; it also was pretested 
with 10 students from other schools. Themes of greater inter-
est were the safety confirmation process, sheltering behavior, 
needs satisfaction, and inputs for individual decision-
making. 
The questionnaire was distributed through the school 
mailing list for international students on 4 August 2011, and 
the deadline for submission of responses was 21 August. 
Access to the official mailing list implied that no sampling 
was necessary, yet this only covered active, regular and 
prospective students, so the survey did not reach exchange 
students, who visit the university for less than one year. 
Therefore, the actual population decreased from 485 to 
396 persons, out of which 97 replied (return rate of 24.5%). 
The language of the survey was English, which was consider 
valid since a high level of proficiency is required to enter 
the university; still, respondents were free to answer in 
Japanese. 
Concerning the respondents, 20 percent of them were 
women and 20 percent of the respondents live with their 
husband or wife, but no couple answered the questionnaire. 
Eight percent of the respondents have children. The language 
proficiency is as follows: no Japanese 24 percent, intermedi-
ate 32 percent, and advanced 44 percent. Funding for a third 
of the sample comes from the Ministry of Education (MEXT); 
other scholarships support 37 percent of the international 
students, while 28 percent receive no scholarship funds. The 
average stay in Japan of surveyed students is 25 months.
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variables for groups such as those covered in this research are 
more frequently assessed using Pearson’s chi-squared test; 
however, this test requires large samples in order to give 
valid results. Since, for instance, only 24 percent of respon-
dents know no Japanese, a contingency table exploring the 
association of language proficiency with the type of shelter 
selected for the first night—university, designated shelter, 
home, or other—would not satisfy the condition for chi-
square to be valid. In those cases, it is necessary to use 
Fisher’s exact test, which was calculated using the software R 
(Agresti and Finlay 2009). 
Finally, the findings are complemented with other kinds 
of qualitative evidence available for the research, namely 
insights from semi-structured interviews with international 
students and researchers (N=16, 5 from the Engineering 
School), informal discussions at the university, direct obser-
vation, and the inputs from projects such as the study carried 
out by Toushinroku, Takakura, and Kimura (2012), which 
includes oral accounts of individual student disaster experi-
ences. The interviewees were selected through snowball 
sampling, which is a common approach when dealing with 
small populations that are difficult to locate (Weiss 1994). In 
our case, the intention was to interview students from other 
campuses and different backgrounds in order to explore the 
possibilities of extrapolating the results for all the students of 
the university. While the evidence is not enough for the latter 
aim, these data are of use in clarifying and adding nuance to 
the findings of the survey. 
4 Survey Results 
Through this section, a summary of the replies to the 
questionnaire for each stage of the emergency included in 
Table 2 is presented. Clarification drawn from the follow-up 
interviews is included when appropriate.
4.1 Immediate Response 
The stage of immediate response included questions regard-
ing the place where students experienced the earthquake 
and details of the safety confirmation process. International 
students were also asked about the best way to confirm 
safety.
4.1.1 Contact to University
From the 78.4 percent of students who were in Sendai on 
11 March, 2:46 p.m., 65.8 percent were at the university, 10.5 
percent were at home, 5.3 percent were somewhere else, and 
the other 18.45 percent did not offer details. We inquired 
when and how they confirmed their personal safety with the 
university and their families. The university was generally 
informed in person (59%), followed by e-mail (26%) and 
cellphone (14%). The answer “personally” includes paper-
based notification at the temporary shelters on each campus 
Table 2. Queries included in the survey questionnaire 
Survey questions
1. Immediate Response
1.1. Where were you when the earthquake occurred? 
1.2.  How did you confirm your personal safety to others? University, 
Family, Others.
1.3.  Did you receive official safety confirmation requests? From whom? 
By what means? In what language? 
1.4.  What do you think was the best (more efficient) means for confirm-
ing your personal safety? 
2. Taking Shelter in Sendai 
2.1.  Did you sleep somewhere other than your own place? If no, what 
were your reasons for not taking shelter?
2.2. Did you stay in more than one shelter? If yes, how many? 
2.3. Where? 
2.4.  If you changed shelters within Sendai, please tell us your reasons.
2.5.  Did you experience any difficulties in the shelter(s)? What 
difficulties? 
2.6. What did you do after taking shelter?
2.7. What were the most important reasons for your decision? 
2.8.  What were your main sources of information that conditioned your 
decision? 
2.9. Were you contacted by your embassy? 
3. Life in Sendai During the Aftermath 
3.1.  What were the main factors preventing you from going back to your 
apartment/room in Sendai? 
3.2. Did you have to queue for food, water, or gas? 
3.3. Where did you get your daily food and water? 
3.4. Did you have problems in moving around Sendai? 
3.5. When did you come to know about the problem in Fukushima?
3.6.  How did it affect you? 
4. Sheltering Outside Sendai 
4.1. When did you move out of Sendai? 
4.2. What mean (s) did you use? 
4.3. Where did you stay?
4.4.  Did you experience shortages of supplies or utilities outages? If yes, 
which? 
4.5.  When did you come to know about the problem in Fukushima? How 
did it affect you?
4.6. Did you leave the country? 
4.7. What were the most important reasons for this decision? 
4.8. Did your sources of information for making decisions change? 
4.9.  When applicable, did you have to leave Japan without a re-entry 
permit?
5. Back to Sendai
5.1. When did you come back to Sendai? 
5.2. Did you change your date of return at least once? 
5.3.  What were the main factors in setting the date? 
6. In Hindsight, 
6.1. What do you think about the reaction of: the University, Yourself 
6.2.  What do you think would be the best possible reaction in a future 
emergency?
6.3.  Did you receive any training in the past about how to react when an 
earthquake occurs?
6.4. Could you apply that knowledge this time? 
7. Your Data 
The collected data were analyzed through simple contin-
gency tables, exploring the association between respondents’ 
traits and behavior during the emergency, as well as the influ-
ence between the stages in the evolution of the emergency 
specified in the questionnaire. Significance in the difference 
between the proportions in contingency tables of categorical 
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or by directly speaking to the professor in charge. The confir-
mation mainly occurred the very same day as the emergency 
(60% of the whole sample), and was almost complete by the 
end of the following week (18 March). Almost half of the 
students who were at the university during the earthquake 
did not confirm their safety personally. Since in principle 
we make no distinction here between laboratories and the uni-
versity as a whole, it is possible that this result is caused by 
how we framed the question. Yet, the dynamics of sheltering, 
examined in the following section, hint at some disarray 
as students moved back and forth between shelters and the 
university, a fact that resonates with this observation. 
4.1.2 Contact with Families
Communication with their families was mainly done through 
cellphones (66%), followed by smaller shares of public 
phones (12%), e-mails (12%), and other Internet services 
(8%). This too was mostly achieved during the first day (65%) 
and finished faster than the university, full confirmation with 
families being completed by 15 March. The survey was not 
specific about whether cellphones were used for phone calls, 
so some of those responses may include Short Message 
Service (SMS); the goal was to find whether the generalized 
difficulties using the cellphone network actually affected stu-
dents. It is not surprising that nobody reported using landline 
telephones for safety confirmation purposes. Students also 
reported having received the official requests for safety con-
firmation from the university later during the following 
week. 
When asked to identify the best (more efficient) way to 
confirm personal safety, students put a premium on e-mail 
(23%) and cellphones (22%). They also commented on other 
means of communication, such as public phones or other 
Internet services, without specifying which one was most 
useful. The number of respondents who did not answer or 
explicitly expressed not knowing the best alternative was 
as large as the two most popular options (22%). The lack of 
response might derive from the difficulties experienced 
during those first days after the emergency, when no one 
means of safety confirmation was totally reliable.
4.2 Taking Shelter in Sendai
Questions about the second stage of the emergency sought 
to describe the behavior during the first few days in which 
students took shelter in the city. It does not include students 
who were outside Sendai during the earthquake.
4.2.1 Reasons for Changing Shelter
Most of the students took shelter starting Friday night, but 
still nearly 20 percent slept at their own homes, mainly 
because they saw no problem in doing so. There were only 
two cases in which problems at the shelters, many of which 
were crowded during the first days, were the cause of students 
moving back to their own homes. The large majority that slept 
in shelters did so at schools and other designated shelters, as 
can be seen in Figure 2. A third of those who went to shelters 
on the first night changed shelters at least once, mainly 
because they formed groups and stayed with friends or 
because they were looking for a more comfortable location 
and a stable supply of utilities and food. Some of the students 
reported a fire in one of the shelters close to the Sanjo 
dormitory, which obliged them to move somewhere else. 
Students stayed on average of two days in the first shelter 
(80% of students) and three to four days in the second shelter 
in Sendai (29%).
Two characteristics of the sheltering behavior deserve 
mention. Those who initially decided not to take shelter but 
sleep at home are not the same students who finally decided 
to stay in Sendai. Thus, skipping the sheltering phase may 
have influenced the decision to leave the city. Besides, there 
is statistical association (p=0.05) between the starting point 
(first bar, Figure 2) and the aftershock decision (last bar): a 
larger share of those in the university resolved to leave the 
Figure 2. Changes of shelter during the initial part of the emergency (share of respondents)
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country, while the rest tried different strategies, specially 
postponing going out of the country in the initial phase of the 
emergency. This suggests that students who experienced the 
earthquake at the university perceived something there while 
leaving—for instance, that the situation was too bad (even if 
that was not the case)—and/or received some information—
for instance, that the university was going to close, that they 
better leave—that affected their subsequent decisions. 
4.2.2 Changes of Shelter during the Emergency
From the summary in Figure 2, we can see that students had 
a very fluid reaction to the emergency, and moved frequently 
during the first days. Few of the students who were at the 
university during the disaster actually took shelter there. This 
was mainly because the university is not a designated shelter 
and the decision to organize one was taken after students were 
disbanded. Four students from the sample actually stayed in 
another university, Sendai Fukushi University (Figure 1), 
which is closer to the Sanjo dormitory and is also not a desig-
nated shelter. This suggests that most of the students actually 
went back home before deciding what to do and once there 
they had to find alternative places to take shelter. 
We tested several variables and their association to the 
sheltering behavior. We found an association (significant at 
0.01) between the decision about shelter site and the existence 
of a close relationship with a Japanese outside the university 
(33% of the sample). In other words, it is more frequent for 
students with a close Japanese relationship to go home or 
somewhere else in Japan instead of leaving the country. There 
is also a weaker, still significant evidence of association 
between the sheltering decision and the time students had 
stayed in Japan: for those who had stayed less than a year and 
between two and three years it was more common to decide 
to leave the country than for the others. This suggests that 
both new comers and those finishing masters programs or 
having entered research status could also decide to leave more 
easily than those in the middle of their research.
4.2.3 Reasons for Leaving Sendai
Around half of the students staying in Sendai experienced 
difficulties in shelters, mainly because of lack of food and 
basic utilities. But these difficulties were not the main reason 
affecting post-disaster shelter decisions. Those who left 
Sendai indicated that their decision was motivated by the 
situation in the nuclear power plant, or other Fukushima-
related safety concerns. Students report coming to know 
about Fukushima almost immediately after events developed 
there, so they got information faster than the general popula-
tion, which we suppose is related to their skills in IT. In con-
trast, evidence gathered through the interviews suggests that 
this observation can be a distortion on their memories about 
those days. Additionally, those who decided to stay in the city 
considered their homes to be safe and Sendai to be relatively 
back to normal. 
4.2.4 Relevance of Information Sources
Students were asked about the sources of information that 
were most important for their decisions, whichever decision 
they made. The results, summarized in Figure 3, show the 
three most relevant sources were students’ families, their 
laboratories, and people of their own nationality. The infor-
mation source with overall larger positive valuation is people 
of the same nationality. 
We did not include any questions about the content of this 
information in the questionnaire, but through semi-structured 
interviews it was possible to explore the issue. Families, once 
safety confirmation was possible, pressured students to return 
home. Problems at the nuclear power plant were the most 
frequently mentioned reason. Family pressure was not limited 
to parental concern, but extended family also directly and 
indirectly pressed students to return; their source of informa-
tion was regularly foreign media and so students reported the 
problem of evaluating what was covered on television and 
what happened in Sendai. The role played by each student’s 
laboratory varies from case to case. Some mention news from 
their labs as well as the university. In some cases students 
were encouraged to leave the city, in others students were 
visited by their professors who checked out their situation. 
Depending on the circumstances, some respondents could not 
meet their lab mates, while others stayed at their professor’s 
home (Toushinroku, Takakura, and Kimura 2012). More 
importantly, students got together with friends, who were 
usually of their own nationality, stayed together, and made 
decisions together. The information entering these groups 
was different for each of them, but the preeminence of these 
three sources of information shows that students while look-
ing for emotional support, and may end up not assessing 
the situation by themselves and relying upon the opinions 
of others. Local primary sources, which carried information 
specific to the situation and needs of the city, were left in the 
background, rather unimportant for most of the respondents. 
Respondents indicate that their respective embassies 
played a limited role in their personal emergency decisions. 
This was the case even after embassies contacted 66 percent 
of those who stayed in Sendai, inquiring about their situation 
and/or encouraging them to evacuate the city. There is no sta-
tistical association between being contacted by the embassy 
and the decision made after leaving the shelter. 
4.3 Life in Sendai during the Aftermath 
The three quarters of the student population who remained in 
Sendai after the earthquake were asked about their experience 
of trying to reestablish normal life in the city. The main 
obstacle to remaining was utilities—gas, electricity and 
water—and, to a lesser extent, food and drinkable water 
supply. Only three people reported damage of their homes, 
although 18 considered the aftershocks a reason to stay 
outside of them.
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Four-fifths of the students who answered this section 
reported having to queue in order to get food, water, or gaso-
line. The average waiting time was around 1.5 hours per line, 
and the total average time spent queuing was 4.5 hours. 
Respondents were free to explain the strategies they followed 
to get food; 60 percent of them actually bought it. Other alter-
natives included sharing with friends, using their own stocks, 
and receiving food from the shelter at which they stayed. 
From the students initially staying in Sendai, 67 percent 
encountered no problems moving around the city, mainly 
because of the common use of bicycles. Those who had prob-
lems were affected either by the shortage of gasoline or the 
disruption of public transportation. 
4.4 Sheltering Outside Sendai 
Figure 4 presents a summary of the movement of students out 
of Sendai, out of Japan, and eventually back again to the city. 
By Monday, 14 March, 45.3 percent of students had left 
Sendai, while the peak period of student departures from 
Japan was between 17 and 18 March. This number includes 
half of the students who in Figure 2 reported going home after 
the earthquake emergency. Because some of them decided 
later to move out of Sendai or Japan, less than 13 percent of 
international students in Sendai eventually stayed there the 
whole time. The main means of transportation were buses, 
presumably those going to Yamagata, from where some 
continued their trip by airplane, bus, or train. Some students 
mentioned also using buses provided by the embassies, as 
well as taxis or private cars.
The main destination was Tokyo, although replies included 
places ranging from Akita to Kobe. The average duration of 
the stay was of four nights, though this is the result of around 
85 percent of the respondents staying a couple of days before 
moving on, and the other 15 percent taking shelter for 
between two and four weeks somewhere else in Japan before 
going back to Sendai. Although not in the proportion 
expressed while in Sendai, some students still experienced 
shortages of supplies in other cities, mainly of food and water. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this movement was far 
from easy for those who did not have a private means of trans-
portation. Buses to Yamagata were crowded by locals trying 
to move out of Sendai. Yamagata, Niigata, and Narita airports 
were also overwhelmed, so some students had to spend at 
least one night at the airport before getting a seat on an 
outbound plane. Complaints of overpriced international air 
tickets were also mentioned. No student reported going to a 
third country to take shelter. 
A final question in this questionnaire section inquired 
about the reentry permit required to come back to Japan and 
whether there were inconveniences leaving the country in a 
hurry. A couple of cases aside, most of the students had no 
problems in this respect. 
4.5 Back to Sendai
Figure 4 presents the pace of students coming back until the 
Golden Week, equivalent to 90 percent of our sample.ii 
The remaining 10 percent came back later during that month, 
and a couple of students returned in June and July. We asked 
students about the importance of a range of factors when 
setting the date of return (Figure 5). We grouped returning 
dates into six groups—“early comers,” “second week of 
April,” “third week of April,” “late April,” “Golden Week,” 
and “late comers”—and tested how the date of return was 
associated with other variables. 
For everyone discussions with his or her professor were 
the most important factor in deciding their return date. 
Students returning early did so after talking to friends and 
family, so for them the restart of classes was less important. 
There is a weak (p=0.0658) association that merits comment: 
the later students came back, the more importance they gave 
to the media. This suggests that although students seem not to 
have placed as much importance to the news as they gave to 
other factors, media information certainly influenced their 
behavior. Figure 5 shows that in addition to discussion with 
Figure 3. Relevance of information sources after the earthquake 
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professors other relevant factors were important too. News 
from non-Japanese friends in Sendai became the second 
most important factor in setting return dates, with positive 
appraisal equal to that of the restart of classes. Warnings from 
the government, which mostly went unchanged during the 
months following the triple disaster, appear at the bottom of 
the importance ranking. Similar to what happened right after 
the emergency’s outbreak, foreign governments seem to have 
played only a secondary role during the whole incident. In 
contrast, those international students with close Japanese 
acquaintances actually gave more importance to the news 
from Japanese friends than the rest of the students.
4.6 In Hindsight
The last section of the questionnaire included four questions 
about the overall experience of the international students 
during the emergency. Three of them were open questions 
and, thus, the qualification of the answers was done 
manually. 
4.6.1 Evaluation of the Response
Questioned about their overall experience, the students in the 
sample had a mostly positive view of the university’s reaction 
(54%). Respondents recognized the magnitude of the chal-
lenge, and thus praised Tohoku University for being good 
enough in its response to the disaster. Only 6 percent of 
the respondents were openly negative, while 40 percent opted 
for a neutral stance or no response at all. The few negative 
aspects mentioned included slowness, both in terms of 
information provision and decision making. 
A minority of students (17%) were willing to criticize their 
own reaction, but the most common answers were neutral 
stances or no comments (55%). Although the negative 
appraisals include conceding to panic and the emotion of the 
Figure 4. Movement of students from and to Sendai 
Figure 5. Factors influencing the return date 
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moment, neutral replies present a deterministic view. Several 
students stated they mainly limited themselves to following 
orders; in their own words “[I] did what I had to do.” It is 
not clear whether this posture implies that students felt they 
never had the option to decide what to do next. This seems 
consistent with a common attitude observed throughout the 
survey, our interviews, and other documents (Toushinroku, 
Takakura, and Kimura 2012), which was the student tendency 
to give preeminence to secondary sources of information.
4.6.2 Safety Confirmation Tools and Emergency Drills
Of special relevance for the analysis, there was general 
approval of safety confirmation and the evacuation training 
provided by the university. But during the subsequent stages 
of the emergency, the role of the university is less clear. 
A large share of the students (71%) had received earthquake 
training, and nearly 58 percent actually put that knowledge 
into practice. Regardless of whether students did or did not 
apply what was learnt through the drills, the training did influ-
ence sheltering behavior. Trained students were more likely 
to go to designated shelters (significant at 0.01), as well as 
more likely to decide to leave the country. Whether leaving 
the country is actually an unintended consequence of drills 
and other trainings, since they promote following fixed 
protocols, is an issue that deserves being explored in future 
studies. 
When asked about the best possible reaction to a future 
emergency, the main concern was information provision. 
Among the characteristics students expect from this infor-
mation are swiftness, accessibility in terms of language, and 
reliability. Students also conceded some usefulness to drills, 
keeping an emergency stock of food and water at home, 
and cooperating with friends, while concerns over safety 
confirmation are barely mentioned. 
5 Discussion: Strengths and 
Weaknesses during the Emergency 
Response
The survey presents a portrait of the experience of interna-
tional students after the triple disaster, describing their initial 
reaction, the stresses to which they were exposed, and the 
decisions that followed and the reasons behind them. It 
covered the period from the outbreak of the emergency until 
students returned to Sendai. From the collected findings, 
there are two major issues that deserve attention: the actual 
performance of the existing disaster preparations and the 
complications of information collection and provision. 
5.1 Performance of the Existing Disaster Preparations
For everyone in the Tohoku area, the 11 March earthquake 
was the strongest tremor they had ever felt and it is no sur-
prise to find a very turbulent situation right after the quake in 
which students moved around, back and forth between differ-
ent shelters, homes, and the university. But students followed 
what they had learned from yearly drills and evacuation pro-
cedures were fulfilled. Those preparations were successful, 
including the safety confirmation process. Full confirmation 
with their families took four days and one week with the uni-
versity. However, reports from the school and university 
do not coincide with students’ replies: besides the initial 
paper-based confirmation, the Engineering School undertook 
complementary safety confirmation through the Internet, 
which finished by 30 March, and the university also under-
took a centralized effort that only received less than thousand 
replies. While redundancy was favored by the university to 
guarantee that the safety confirmation process covered every-
one, students may have considered that replying once was 
good enough. The problem after 18 March was to harmonize 
the overlap of information, which took lots of time and effort 
to verify (Nakajima 2011). Concern for efficiency suggests 
developing an unified safety confirmation systems. But pro-
fessors from the School of Engineering favor a multiplicity 
of confirmation means, since the top priority is connecting 
with 100 percent of the students. Despite criticisms in the 
mass media, cellphone and Internet infrastructures were good 
enough to satisfy the basic goal of keeping relatives in touch 
with the students. Even though students did not conclusively 
cite any single method as the best means, an improved safety 
confirmation method is not a priority concern. 
The major issue on this occasion was something not 
covered by the drills: the period of time that followed the 
main tremors before student safety confirmation occurred. 
Students exhibited erratic sheltering behavior, changing 
places during the first post-tremor days as they went back to 
the school or joined friends. In this respect, research by the 
Sendai International Relations Association (SIRA) found that 
this behavior could have a negative impact during emergen-
cies (Sendai City Government 2013). The original idea of 
shelters is to offer a safe haven for the inhabitants of the area 
around the shelter. When students formed groups and moved 
to shelters far from their residences, Japanese staying in those 
shelters may have felt uneasy. There is anecdotal evidence of 
this uneasiness occurring in two shelters, though it did not 
become a major problem. A possible lesson is to maintain 
temporary shelters inside the university premises—
something that Tohoku University is already undertaking. 
Students are not necessarily familiar with the location and the 
implications of sleeping in a shelter, and part of recovering 
their sense of security is meeting with their friends. So staying 
at the university is an attractive option to maintain calm. 
Future drills should include a broader picture of what it is like 
to experience a megadisaster in a densely populated country 
by including in the training program anticipated conditions 
and coping strategies for several days after the occurrence of 
the earthquake—hopefully one week (Gomez 2013). In this 
way, students and laboratories can be more autonomous in 
their responses to the emergency. SIRA and international 
students from Tohoku University have already held such a 
drill for the first time. 
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The survey alone does not offer enough information to 
evaluate the impact of advising students to go home (some-
times to the other side of the world), but some inputs can 
help informing the discussion. Between the peak of students 
leaving Sendai and those leaving the country (Monday 14 and 
Friday 18, respectively) the situation of at least one of the 
engineering campuses was practically recovered. The report 
of radiation on-campus never indicated spikes to dangerous 
levels. Interviews revealed that students were exposed to 
multiple stresses on their way home: long lines and prolonged 
waits to gain access to transportation, sleeping in airports, 
paying very high prices for air tickets, and experiencing a 
mood of increased anxiety generated by the stress encoun-
tered everywhere around them. This could possibly be the 
source of additional PTSD exhibited by some students. There 
is also evidence showing that students leaving can trigger 
panic flight behavior among other foreign national communi-
ties (Gomez 2012). International students not only study, but 
they also are part of the population of the city, which can 
affect the distribution of food and other economic activities.
Despite these issues, the majority of students left before 
the university countermeasures team had made any decision, 
so both reforms to the slow, centralized response and a 
strengthening of the link between international students and 
the university are warranted. The survey showed that a close 
relationship to a Japanese citizen was associated with a more 
balanced reaction to the emergency, but the number of stu-
dents having such a relationship is limited, despite established 
efforts to generate such bonds, for example, through home-
stays, holiday tours, and tutors. Two future tasks emerge from 
this situation: discovery of the reasons why international stu-
dent contact with Japanese culture and society is not bigger 
and exploration of the possibility that by deciding to close the 
university broke the linkage of students and local society, 
making their reaction closer to that of tourists. Part of this 
connection is emotional, a sphere of human interaction that 
goes beyond the present article’s methodology, and other part 
is informational, which is the next point at stake. 
5.2 Information Collection and Provision
The survey shows that students relied more heavily for infor-
mation, advice, and support on the family, the laboratory, and 
friends of the same nationality during the emergency: in other 
words, they depended on secondary sources of information. 
The grouping behavior in shelters is consistent with this find-
ing. Yet according to the questions on safety confirmation, 
students actually had access to the Internet for information. 
These factors hint at passivity in student information demand. 
Fear of radiation from Fukushima is a good example. Inter-
national hype reached the families of students abroad, and 
families pressured students to evacuate without actual knowl-
edge about the situation in Sendai. Through the interviews, 
many recognized that the city was quickly regaining nor-
mality, yet pressure coming from their homes abroad was 
stronger.
Institutions such as Tohoku University were capable of 
making scientific assessments of the situation and providing 
expert advice, which the university eventually did, but it was 
too late to inform international students. One week after the 
emergency, a research center of the university was already 
monitoring and posting on the Internet radiation measure-
ments that showed the limited magnitude of the threat, but 
this source of information was not mentioned by any respon-
dent of the survey—although it was possible to confirm that 
some knew about it through the interviews. Given the passiv-
ity of students, publishing information on a web page might 
not be enough. 
As students returned, professors as representatives of 
the university became more relevant, as well as other inter-
national students already in Sendai. At that point Facebook 
groups and e-mail magazines emerged, directly posting infor-
mation about the recovery process in the city. The importance 
assigned by students to this source of information seems to 
resonate with the Tohoku University strategy of asking inter-
national students themselves to tell prospective students about 
the positive evolution of the region in general and Sendai in 
particular. The major challenge for the university, as pointed 
out by the survey, is serving as a timely source of information. 
Even if the university is not the primary source of decision-
making information, it has the ability to work as a conduit for 
information, using strategies similar to the automatic service 
of safety confirmation in order to let students know about the 
situation of the city in a more timely fashion and from more 
reliable sources.
There are several factors that complicate the task of 
satisfying the wish of international students for reliable infor-
mation. It has to be clear from the outset that students are 
the only ones who can decide what they should do next. 
Otherwise, expecting to be told what to do instead of what the 
situation is can affect the willingness to help of other actors in 
the capacity of providing or channelizing information because 
it could imply being held responsible for whatever they say. 
Information during disasters is always full of uncertainty, so 
officials responsible for providing information are naturally 
hesitant about making mistakes; that the persons demanding 
information expect to be told what to do makes this hesitancy 
worse. This attitude could dissuade capable emergency 
information providers, such as the university, from actively 
disseminating information before it is absolutely sure that 
information is accurate.
The sources of information that were relevant for students 
were not necessarily the ones that could be expected to 
possess the better assessment of the situation in Sendai. 
Families mostly relied on foreign media, which can be poorly 
informed or biased, as students recognize themselves. There 
is no evidence that friends of their own nationality have better 
information than students themselves have. If everyone relied 
on somebody else in our sample to assess the available data, 
then who was assessing the situation? Local media were not 
among the most important sources of information. Embassies 
148 Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. Vol. 4, No. 3, 2013
also generated little information themselves. Some of them 
did offer the means to move out of Sendai, but in many cases 
they did not have knowledge of the city, did not have the 
capabilities to do what they intended to do, also suffered from 
a language barrier, lacked prepared concrete emergency plans, 
and in some cases created conflicts among compatriots 
(Gomez 2012). 
Given this situation, it seems that universities are in a priv-
ileged position to filter information and reach students who 
need local, trustable information in order to evaluate what to 
do next. University laboratories are among the top sources of 
information contacted by students and most probably have a 
deeper knowledge of the area than families and friends abroad, 
which can make the difference under post-disaster stress. 
Evidence from the Toushinroku, Takakura, and Kimura (2012) 
and other interviews show that several professors directing 
laboratories undertook this kind of intervention strategy. 
They took students to their homes, offered shelter, food, and 
tranquility after the disaster. They even helped international 
students to gain access to different information sources. But 
they stopped short from telling students what to do, even 
when they were asked for direction. What professors offered 
was some security and access to reliable information. But stu-
dents remained responsible for themselves. This may not be 
a strategy that could be generalized, but it can be the start 
for future considerations on the role of professors and the 
university during emergencies. 
6 The Challenge of Informed 
Autonomous Decision-Making
The present article offers a general picture of the reaction of 
international students to a mega-disaster in a globalized urban 
setting. There is little research about this population in the 
literature and thus the research is centered on describing the 
particular case at Tohoku University’s School of Engineering, 
trying to identify sources of vulnerability and disaster man-
agement lessons. Possible lessons from the survey include 
widening the time range of action included on disaster drills, 
and considering the possibility of universities becoming a 
“designated” shelter for international students wishing to 
stay on campus. Safety confirmation does not appear to be a 
problem for students, although universities may have to find 
ways to harmonize different sources of information more 
efficiently. 
Some factors that can support the distinct vulnerability 
of international students were identified. Students often 
appeared to be passive information receivers and to rely 
mostly on secondary, presumably decontextualized, sources 
of information in order to decide what to do after the disaster. 
Accelerated reaction could expose them to additional harm 
and be economically onerous. Emphasis was given to the 
potential role of the host university as an authoritative infor-
mation provider, recognizing that it is desirable to have 
multiple providers of advice during emergencies. Even if 
every lesson is reflected in new strategies, disaster may strike 
when students are not at the university, or some students 
would still prefer to leave the campus without confirming 
safety and go home. It would be equally wrong to expect 
students just to do nothing while a centralized emergency 
response team is formed and decisions are made. In those 
cases, other social actors start playing a significant role 
during an emergency. Actually, international students are not 
different from other Japanese citizens. The 2009 White Book 
on Disaster Prevention prepared by the Cabinet Office 
includes a survey on what is actually the most useful thing 
during a disaster. This shows that impacted individuals also 
give the highest priority to family, themselves, and neighbors, 
followed by other organizations (Cabinet Office 2009). But 
for international students, such networks are not always 
rooted in the area, or the linkage is not as strong: just a couple 
of respondents mentioned being helped by their landlady/
landlord, and 64 percent reported having no close relation to 
any Japanese. The results from our survey suggest that deeper 
links with Japanese society influences behavior after a dis-
aster and can positively influence future reaction during 
the extended phase of a similar emergency. In theory, helping 
students to integrate more with Japanese society might also 
improve their decision-making during a crisis situation. But 
there is no silver bullet to advance this objective, a long-
standing problem. In the meantime, universities are the stron-
gest link between students, the city, and the region, and so 
they should take the lead in addressing future challenges. 
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Notes
i Disabilities were also included in that occasion. The information is 
available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5151. 
ii The Golden Week is a Japanese term for the period containing the 
public holidays in April 29 and May 3, 4, and 5.
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